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WHO IS AN INDIAN? SEARCHING FOR AN ANSWER TO THE
QUESTION AT THE CORE OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
Margo S. Brownell*
The definition of Indian is the measure of eligibility for a variety of bene-
fits and programs provided to Indians under federal law. There is
confusion, however, at the core of efforts to define "Indian." This confu-
sion raises many concerns about the role that government plays in
defining "Indian." This Note surveys the most common definitions of
"Indian "found in federal statutes, BIA regulations, and state laws. The
author argues that the racial basis of many of these laws and regulations
are unconstitutional and tread on the sovereignty of Indian tribes. She
evaluates efforts of the federal government to avoid these problematic defi-
nitions. Finally, she proposes the adoption of a uniform federal definition
of "Indian" based on the definition of "Indian"found in the Arts and
Crafts Act of 1990. Such a definition would defer to tribal sovereignty
and address the financial and administrative concerns of the federal gov-
ernment while remaining within constitutional guidelines.
INTRODUCTION
"I feel as if I'm not a real Indian until I've got that BIA stamp
of approval .... You're told all your life that you're Indian,
but sometimes you want to be that kind of Indian that every-
body else accepts as Indian."-Cynthia Hunt, Lumbee Indian'
On January 21, 2000, newspapers across the country featured a
picture of a wizened eighty-two-year-old Inupiaq Eskimo elder
named Stanton Katchatag who lives in the remote village of
Unalakleet, Alaska.2 Mr. Katchatag was famous that day because he
was in the distinguished position of being the first American to be
* Attorney, Robins, Kaplan, Miller & Ciresi, L.L.P., Minneapolis, MN. Managing Ar-
ticle Editor, University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform, Volume 33. B.A. 1984, Barnard
College, Columbia University; J.D. 2000, University of Michigan Law School. A previous
version of this Note won first place in the Sovereignty Symposium 2000, a national law stu-
dent writing competition on topics in Indian Law, sponsored by the Oklahoma Supreme
Court. The author wishes to express her thanks to Professor Peter K Westen, University of
Michigan Law School, for his guidance and assistance.
1. FERGUS M. BORDEWICH, KILLING THE WHITE MAN'S INDIAN 63 (1996).
2. E.g., Kim Murphy, Census Seeking to Leave No One Out in the Cold, L.A. TIMES, Jan.
21, 2000, at Al.
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counted in the 2000 Census.3 The article that accompanies Mr.
Katchatag's picture cites Census Director Kenneth Prewitt as hold-
ing Unalakleet up as a symbol for the Census's effort to count
every American.4 Prewitt hoped that the small, remote Alaskan vil-
lage could set a standard for the rest of the country.5
At stake in the Census count is $180 billion dollars a year in fed-
eral funds that are apportioned on the basis of census population.6
According to JoAnn K Chase, Executive Director of the National
Congress of American Indians, "[t]he stability and the quality of
the data for our population is of concern since it is a relatively
small population (about 2 million in 1990) and this data is used to
disburse federal program funds to American Indian Tribal and
Alaska Native Village governments." 7 In Alaska, with its 104,750
Native Alaskans, getting an accurate count is especially crucial. "It
will affect the funding we receive from the Indian Health Service,"
said Larry Ivanoff, president of the local tribal organization in
Unalakleet.8
There is a subtle irony behind the celebration of Mr. Katchatag
as the first enumerated American of the 2000 Census: the racial,
ethnic, and legal classification of Mr. Katchatag and his fellow Es-
kimos for purposes of the Census, as well as for a myriad of federal
Indian programs, is not as easy as riding a snowmobile around
Unalakleet to get an accurate head count. Rather, it requires un-
raveling more than a century of federal Indian law and policy on
the question of who an Indian is and what, if any, federal benefits
Indians are entitled to receive by virtue of their blood and tribal
affiliation.
The definition of "Indian" is the measure of eligibility that the
government uses for benefits and preferences provided to Indians
under a variety of federal programs. Yet, there is confusion at the
core of efforts to define "Indian." The Census, for example, takes
one approach; it allows individuals to self-identify as Indian by
3. Maureen Clark, Coldly Calculating in Alaska: U.S. Head Count Begins Here, Under Win-
ter's Crip, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2000, at A3; D'Vera Cohn, Census Gets Warm Welcome;
Director Starts U.S. Tally With Knock on Door in Alaskan Village, WASH. POST, Jan. 20, 2000, at
A3; Stephen A. Holmes, In Remote Alaska, Counting Begins for the Census, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21,
2000, at Al; Murphy, supra note 2, at Al.
4. E.g., Murphy, supra note 2, at Al.
5. Clark, supra note 3, at A3.
6. Murphy, supra note 2, at Al.
7. Federal Measures on Race and Ethnicity: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Gov't Mgmt.,
Info., and Tech. of the House Comm. on Gov't Reform and Oversight, 105th Cong. 4-5 (1997)
[hereinafter Gov't Mgmt. Hearings] (statement of JoAnn K. Chase, Executive Director, Na-
tional Congress of American Indians), available at 1997 WL 277011.
8. Clark, supra note 3, at A3.
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checking the racial category "Native American/Alaska Native." 9
Other laws are more restrictive, requiring membership in a feder-
ally recognized Indian tribe, "Indian descent," one-half or one-
quarter Indian blood, and/or residence on a reservation.' This
definitional landscape is further complicated by the fact that these
criteria often conflict with tribal membership provisions. The un-
tenable result of this situation is that an individual may be an
"Indian" for the purpose of receiving educational grants but not
health benefits." Or, he may be eligible to be chief of his tribe but
yet not an "Indian" for the purposes of obtaining a Bureau of In-
dian Affairs (BIA) loan or an Indian scholarship to a state
university." Felix Cohen sums it up this way:
Some people ... can be an Indian for one purpose but not
for another. A Caucasian or person of little Indian ancestry
might become a tribal member by adoption for some pur-
poses, such as voting and participation in tribal government,
but not be an Indian for purposes of federal criminal jurisdic-
tion. An Indian whose tribe has been terminated will not be
considered an Indian for most federal purposes. Nevertheless,
such a person remains an Indian ethnologically and contin-
ues to be a tribal member for internal tribal purposes.13
This confusion raises many concerns not only about the coher-
ence of federal Indian policy but also about the role that the
government plays in defining "Indian." From the government's
point of view, the greatest concern is the extent to which statutes
and regulations providing benefits to Indians are based on poten-
tially unconstitutional racial criteria: blood quantum and Indian
descent. These racial criteria were deemed permissible, and even
necessary, throughout much of nineteenth- and twentieth-century
Indian policy. Increasing concerns over equal protection and tribal
sovereignty, however, suggest that the federal government may no
longer be an acceptable arbiter of race-based eligibility standards.
4
Thus, the current challenge facing both the federal government
and Indians is to forge a policy regarding the definition of
9. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 66.
10. Id. at 67.
11. Id.
12. See Sharon O'Brien, Tribes and Indians: With Whom Does the United States Maintain a
Relationship, 66 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1461, 1483-86 (1991) (describing current goveniment
methods of determining Indian status for allotment of benefits).
13. FELIX COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 26 (1982).
14. See discussion infra Part II.A on the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 and the
Self Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975.
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"Indian" that reconciles (1) the government's concern for uphold-
ing the U.S. Constitution and limiting its financial responsibility
towards Indians; (2) the tribes' demands for sovereignty and self-
determination; and (3) the needs and rights of non-tribal Indians
who have been increasingly orphaned by federal Indian law. Part I
of this Note describes the legal landscape in which Indians find
themselves struggling to reconcile the manifold versions of Indian
identity promulgated by both the federal and state governments.
This section describes the most common definitions of Indian
found in federal statutes, BIA regulations, and state laws. Part II
argues that the racial underpinnings of many of the laws and BIA
regulations that define "Indian" are unconstitutional and tread on
the sovereignty of the Indian tribes. Part III outlines recent efforts
of the federal government to steer clear of those definitions. Part
IV discusses possible solutions to this incoherence and proposes a
definition that is constitutional, deferential to tribal sovereignty,
and inclusive of Indians who have fallen between the cracks of pre-
vious provisions, at the same time that it addresses the
government's need to watch its bottom line.
I. THE DEFINITIONAL LANDSCAPE
There is no one definition of "Indian" that serves all federal
purposes. According to one congressional survey, federal legisla-
tion contains over thirty-three different definitions of the term
"Indian."15 Both the federal government and the courts have de-
fined the term "Indian" for many purposes, including eligibility for
social programs, jurisdiction in criminal matters, preference in
government hiring, and administration and distribution of tribal
property. 6 While there are numerous combinations of criteria
used to define the term "Indian," legislation and regulations deal-
ing with "Indians" generally fall into one of three categories:
(1) those that use definitions based on blood quantum; (2) those
that use definitions based on tribal status; and (3) those lacking
any definition at all.
15. O'Brien, supra note 12, at 1481. This number is actually much higher if one in-
cludes the hundreds of tribal enrollment statutes. E.g., Shoshone Tribal Rolls of 1971, 25
U.S.C. § 585 (1994); Yakima Tribal Rolls of 1946, 25 U.S.C. § 601 (1994); Lac Vieux Desert
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Tribal Rolls of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 1300h-3 (1994).
16. COHEN, supra note 13, at 23.
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A. Definitions Based on Blood
The earliest attempts by the courts and the federal government
to pinpoint Indian identity relied on racial traits and biased cul-
tural stereotypes. In 1869, for example, the Supreme Court of New
Mexico Territory decided that the Pueblos were not Indians be-
cause they were "honest, industrious, and law-abiding citizens"17
and "a people living for three centuries in fenced abodes and cul-
tivating the soil for the maintenance of themselves and families." 8
Eight years later, the United States Supreme Court agreed with this
conclusion, stating that, although the Pueblos were Indians "in fea-
ture, complexion, and a few of their habits,"' 9 they were not
Indians because they were "a peaceable, industrious, intelligent,
honest, and virtuous people."2 0 The United States Supreme Court
changed its mind in 1913, however, after receiving BIA agents' re-
ports that the Pueblos engaged in drunkenness, debauchery,
dancing, and communal life.
21
With the Dawes Severalty Act of 1887, the blood quantum first
became important as a determinant of when an Indian would be
allowed to alienate an allotment of land.22 The BIA thought that
the less Indian blood an individual possessed, or the "whiter" he
was, the more sophisticated he would be in his dealings with land
speculators and the less he would need federal protection.24 In ad-
dition, at that time, many whites and blacks were claiming to be
Indian in order to acquire allotments of land. 5 The federal policy
was to bar whites adopted by tribes from gaining an interest in
tribal property distribution.26 While the Dawes Rolls listed blood
17. United States v. Lucero, I N.M. 422, 438 (1869), quoted in COHEN, supra note 13, at
22 n.25.
18. Id. at 442.
19. United States v.Joseph, 94 U.S. 614, 616 (1877), quoted in COHEN, supra note 13, at
22 n.25.
20. Id.
21. United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 39-47 (1913) (holding that Pueblo land in
New Mexico was "Indian country" for purposes of prohibiting the introduction of liquor
into "Indian country" as a constitutional power within Congress's purview to regulate com-
merce with "Indian tribes"); see also BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 66.
22. Dawes Severalty Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887).
23. Steve Russell, A Black and White Issue: The Invisibility of American Indians in Racial
Policy Discourse, 4 GEO. PUB. POL'y REV. 129, 132 (1999).
24. Id.
25. GAIL K. SHEFFIELD, THE ARBITRARY INDIAN 82 (1997).
26. See The Protection of Indians Act of 1988, 25 U.S.C. § 181 (1994). This Act pro-
vides that:
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quantum of individual Indians, Indians themselves were aware that
blood quantum determinations were carelessly performed and
routinely inaccurate.27 The degree of racial intermingling that oc-
curred within the Five Civilized Tribes8 alone was reflected in the
fact that African American freedmen made up twenty-three per-
cent of the members listed on the final rolls and adopted whites
made up another three percent.'
Congress began incorporating blood quantum requirements
into Indian legislation in the early twentieth-century; as a result,
many statutes and BIA regulations have provided services to
Indians on the basis of a one-half or one-quarter blood quantum. 3
The most prominent of these early statutes, and the touchstone for
many subsequent definitions of "Indian" under federal law, is the
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) .
Many BIA regulations governing the administration of federal
Indian benefit programs also rely on a one-half or one-quarter
blood quantum requirement. Examples of such regulations in-
clude the Indian Hiring Preference, 2 Employment Assistance for
Adult Indians,ss Vocational Training for Adult Indians," Educa-
tional Loans and Grants, 5 and Land Acquisition . 36 In addition, the
BIA's Indian Education policies define an eligible Indian or Alaska
Native student as one who is "recognized by the Secretary of the
no white man, not otherwise a member of any tribe of Indians, who may... marry an
Indian woman, member of any Indian tribe in the United States... shall by such
marriage... acquire any right to any tribal property, privilege, or interest whatever
to which any member of such tribe is entitled.
Id.
27. Russell, supra note 23, at 132.
28. The "Five Civilized Tribes" include the (i) Cherokee, (ii) Choctaw, (iii) Chickasaw,
(iv) Creek, and (v) Seminole nations. These five tribes were forcibly removed from their
ancestral homelands in the southeastern United States and relocated to the "Indian Terri-
tory" in the early nineteenth-century. ANGIE DEBO, AND STILL THE WATERs RUN: THE
BETRAYAL OF THE FIVE CIVILIZED TRIBES 3-5 (1984).
29. Id. at 47.
30. One of the earliest laws to use the one-quarter blood quantum was the Indian Ap-
propriations Act of 1918. It states "[n]o appropriation, except appropriations made
pursuant to treaties, shall be used to educate children of less than one-fourth Indian blood
whose parents are citizens of the United States." Indian Appropriation Act, 65 Pub. L. No.
159, 40 Star. 561, 564 (1918) (codified as amended at 25 U.S.C. § 297 (1918)) (repealed
1985).
31. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994). See discussion of the IRA, infra Part II.A.
32. 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 (2000).
33. 25 C.F.R. § 2 6.1 (g) (2000).
34. 25 C.F.R. § 27.1(i) (2000).
35. 25 C.F.R. § 40.1 (2000).
36. 25 C.F.R. § 151.2(c)(3) (2000).
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Interior as eligible for Federal services, because of their status as
Indians or Alaska Natives, whose Indian blood quantum is 1/4 de-
",37
gree or more.
Other statutes require proof of both tribal enrollment and a
one-quarter blood quantum. 3 8 In order to administer this blood
quantum requirement, the BIA issues to Indians an identity card,
referred to universally as the "CDIB," or Certificates of Degree of
Indian Blood, which states an individual's blood quantum and
serves as a ticket to eligibility for BIA services.
The majority of state laws affecting Indian entitlements also rely
heavily on the blood quantum criterion to limit eligibility. A Min-
nesota economic development law defines an "Indian economic
enterprise" as "any commercial, industrial, or business activity es-
tablished or organized for the purpose of profit, at least 51 percent
of which is owned by persons of 25 percent or more Indian
blood."0 Michigan and Alaska rely on the one-quarter blood quan-
tum as the basis for eligibility for their Indian college tuition
waiver programs. The Michigan tuition waiver law defines Ameri-
can Indian as "a person who is not less than 1/4 quantum blood
Indian as certified by the person's tribal association and verified by
the Michigan commission on Indian Affairs,"41 whereas the Alaska
tuition waiver requires an American Indian receiving the benefit to
be either a descendant of a member of the aboriginal races inhab-
iting the state at annexation or a descendant of at least one-quarter
blood from an Indian or Eskimo who migrated to the state from
Canada between 1867 and 1952.42
B. Definitions Based on Tribal Status
While the blood quantum is prominent in legislation from the
first half of the twentieth century, laws enacted since the 1970s
have increasingly relied on definitions based on membership in a
federally recognized tribe. The prototypical provision is a two-part
definition: (1) "Indian" is defined as "a person who is a member of
37. 25 C.F.R. § 32.4(z) (2000); see also 25 C.F.R. § 31.1 (2000) (discussing qualifying
enrollment in federal schools); 25 C.F.R. § 36.3 (2000) (defining an "Indian student").
38. E.g., 25 C.F.R. § 20.1 (2000) (setting eligibility for federal financial assistance and
social services).
39. Underwood v. Deputy Ass't Sec'y-Indian Affairs, 93 Interior Dec. 13, 20 (1986),
available at 1986 WL 222929.
40. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 469.110 (West 1998).
41. MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 390.1252 (West 1997).
42. ALAsKA STAT. § 14.43.075 (Michie 1998).
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an Indian tribe" and (2) "Indian tribe" is defined as "any Indian
tribe, band, nation, or other organized group or community ...
which is recognized as eligible for the special programs and serv-
ices provided by the United States to Indians because of their
status as Indians."
43
The most prominent example of legislation incorporating this
type of definition is the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act of 1975.4 This Act authorizes the government to
contract with tribes and tribal organizations for the planning and
45administration of federal Indian service programs.
Many laws require membership in a federally recognized tribe as
a condition to the conferral of federal benefits. One of the few
laws that extends its reach beyond federally recognized tribes,
however, is the Indian Health Care Improvement Act of 1976.46
This Act covers members of terminated and state-recognized tribes
and descendants of members of such tribes, in addition to mem-
bers of federally recognized tribes. The provision offers eligibility
to any individual who is "a member of a tribe, band, or other or-
ganized group of Indians, including those ... terminated since
1940 and those recognized now or in the future by the state in
which they reside, or who is a descendant, in the first or second
degree, of any such member.
" 4
1
Probably the most deferential definition used by Congress to
date is the one incorporated into the Arts and Crafts Act of 1990. 48
This Act defines as an Indian "any individual who is a member of
an Indian tribe; or for the purposes of this section is certified as an
Indian artisan by an Indian tribe."49 Like the Indian Health Care
Improvement Act, this law includes state-recognized tribes in the
definition of "Indian tribes."50
43. 25 U.S.C. § 450b(e) (1994).
44. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450-458(e) (1994).
45. Id.; see also Karl A. Funke, Education Assistance and Employment Preference: Who Is an
Indian, 4AM. INDIAN L. REV. 1, 36 (1976).
46. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1683 (1994).
47. 25 U.S.C. § 1603(c) (1994).
48. 25 U.S.C. § 305(e)(d)(1) (1994).
49. Id.
50. Id. Membership-based definitions appear in numerous BIA regulations, particu-
larly those dealing with economic development programs. E.g., Loans to Indians Involving
Revolving Loan Fund, 25 C.F.R. § 101.1 (2000); Loans for Financing Reservation Economic
Enterprises and Housing, 25 C.F.R. § 103.1 (2000); Housing Improvement Program, 25
C.F.R. § 256.2 (2000); Indian Business Development Program, 25 C.F.R. § 286.1 (2000).
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C. No Definition at All
There are some laws that use the word "Indian" but provide no
definition at all, giving the BIA and the courts an opportunity to
craft their own interpretation. An example is the Snyder Act of
1921, 5' which provides the underlying congressional authority for
most BIA activities. 52 Another is the Johnson-O'Malley Act of
1934, 3 which authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to contract
with a state or territory to fund educational, medical, agricultural,
and social welfare programs for Indians through state agencies.5
4
The Major Crimes Act,55 which establishes federal court jurisdic-
tion for certain crimes committed in Indian Country when the
defendant is Indian, is also silent regarding the definition of
"Indian."56 Federal courts have interpreted the term as referring to
an individual who is identified by his tribal community as an In-
diani and have not required formal tribal enrollment as part of the
definition of Indian.57 The Department of Justice (DOJ), however,
does require that a defendant be an enrolled member of a tribe in
order to fall under the Act.&
51. 25 U.S.C. § 13 (1994).
52. Id.; see also Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 205-06 (1974).
53. 25 U.S.C. §§ 452-457 (1994).
54. Id.
55. 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (1994).
56. Id.
57. United States v. Antelope, 430 U.S. 641, 646-47 n.7 (1977) (stating that enroll-
ment in a recognized tribe was not an absolute requirement for federal jurisdiction where
the Indian defendant lived on the reservation and "maintained tribal relations with the
Indians thereon"); Alberty v. United States, 162 U.S. 499, 500-01 (1896) (holding that nei-
ther the defendant, a former black slave who had been granted membership in the
Cherokee Nation, nor the victim, who was the illegitimate son of a Chocktaw and a black
woman and who had married a Chocktaw Indian, were Indians); United States v. Rogers, 45
U.S. (4 How.) 567, 573 (1846) (interpreting the meaning of "Indian" under the Trade and
Intercourse Act of 1834, the precursor of the Major Crimes Act, not to apply to a white man
who had been adopted into the Cherokee tribe); see also Allison Dussias, Geographically-Based
and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court's Changing Vision, 55
U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 81-82 (1993).
58. 137 CONG. REc. 23,673 (1991) (statement of Senator Daniel K. Inouye). In the
wake of Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), the Senate debated a bill to reinstate the power
of Indian tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over Indians. Senator Inouye pointed out
that although tide 18 does not provide a statutory definition of "Indian," both federal and
state case law have provided specific guidelines on how it is defined for the purposes of the
Major Crimes Act. 137 CONG. REc. 23,673 (1991). He stated that the Department ofJustice
policy requires that a person charged as an "Indian" be enrolled in a tribe. Id. While Indian
status is stipulated in most cases, proof is based on several factors when it is contested, none
of which is determinative: (i) degree of Indian blood (though this alone is not enough); (ii)
whether the person is recognized as an Indian by his tribe of origin, or his host tribe if he is
living on another tribe's reservation (though this by itself will not suffice); (iii) that a person
has established his status as an Indian by enrolling or seeking to enroll in a tribe; and (iv) by
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To make matters more confusing, the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA) relies on the Major Crimes Act in defining an Indian as
"any person who would be subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States as an Indian under section 1153, title 18, [United States
Code] if that person were to commit an offense listed in that sec-
tion in Indian country to which that section applies."
59
During a Senate debate concerning criminal jurisdiction of In-
dians, Senator Daniel K Inouye explained the rationale behind
the ICRA definition.6° He stated that the Major Crimes Act was in-
corporated by reference into the definition of "Indian" under the
Indian Civil Rights Act so that there would be a consistent defini-
tion in the exercise of jurisdiction by the federal government and
the tribal government.61 In other words, the definitions were coor-
dinated so that an individual cannot claim to be an Indian for the
purposes of federal jurisdiction and then try to use another defini-
tion for the purposes of avoiding tribal jurisdiction. Conversely,
the Major Crimes Act prohibits a person from seeking to be an In-
dian for the purposes of tribal jurisdiction and then denying his
status as an Indian for the purposes of federal jurisdiction.
II. PLAYING THE RACE CARD
A. The Racial Underpinnings of the IRA
The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 (IRA) was one of the
first statutes to provide a legislative definition of "Indian."62
Although it was not the first law to use the blood quantum to
restrict the definition of Indian, it was certainly the most
influential. Section 19 of the IRA defines "Indian" as:
[A] 11 persons of Indian descent who are members of any rec-
ognized Indian tribe now under Federal jurisdiction, and all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on
June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any
seeking and being provided services by a Federal agency because of his status as an Indian.
Id. at 23,674. Even if a defendant is eligible for enrollment in a federally recognized tribe,
however, it does not mean he will be considered an Indian for the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1153. Id.
59. 25 U.S.C. § 1301 (1994).
60. 137 CONG. REc. 23,673 (1991).
61. Id.
62. Indian Appropriations Act of 1918, 25 U.S.C. § 297 (repealed 1985). See discussion
supra Part I.A.
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Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons
of one-half or more Indian blood.3
Individuals meeting any one of these three criteria can obtain
from the government a range of benefits, including tuition loans,
loans for economic development, Indian preference in BIA em-
ployment, the right to petition the Secretary of Indian Affairs to
take land in trust, and the right to organize as an Indian group or
community. 64
Passage of the IRA marked a major turning point in federal In-
dian policy; the Act halted the destructive allotment policy, which
had reduced tribal lands by two-thirds in 50 years, and reversed the
federal policy of assimilation.65 The IRA provides three alternative
criteria for eligibility: (1) tribal membership, (2) ancestral descent,
and (3) blood quantum.6 Taken together, these criteria reflect a
statutory attempt to define the term "Indian" inclusively, in a way
that addresses legal, political, racial, and cultural categories.
In drafting section 19 of the IRA, Congress created three classes
of Indians.67 The first class, described as the "Membership Class," 6
includes "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any
recognized Indian tribe"69 and is defined without regard to blood
quantum. The second class, described as the "Descendant Class,""
includes "all persons who are descendants of such members who
were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of
any Indian reservation,7' and is defined without regard to either
blood quantum or tribal membership. The third class, described as
the "Unaffiliated One-Half Blood Class,"72 includes "all other per-
sons of one-half or more Indian blood"73 and thus offers eligibility
63. Id. (emphasis added).
64. Memorandum from Scott Keep, Assistant Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs 2 (July 12, 1981) [hereinafter Keep Memo of
1981] (on file with author) (citing 25 U.S.C. § 461 et seq. (1994)).
65. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 71-72.
66. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
67. Id.; see also Funke, supra note 45, at 10-32; John Collier, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs, Enrollment Under the Indian Reorganization Act, Circular No. 3134 (Mar. 7, 1936)
[hereinafter Circular 3134] (on file with author).
68. AMERICAN INDIAN POLICY REVIEW COMM'N, TASK FORCE ON LAW CONSOLIDATION,
REVISION AND CODIFICATION, FINAL REPORT OF TASK FORCE 9 TO THE UNITED STATES CON-
GRESS 110 (1970) [hereinafter AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT].
69. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
70. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 110.
71. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
72. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 10; Circular 3134, supra note 67, at
1.
73. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
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for benefits to those who are not tribal members or residents on a
reservation.
The Senate hearings on the bill show that Congress was aware
that no minimum blood quantum was to be placed on either the
membership or descendant class.4 Karl A. Funke, in his influential
1976 article Educational Assistance and Employment Preference: Who is
an Indian?, states that "a person of as little as 'one sixty-fourth' In-
dian blood could be included in the membership class and a
person of as little as a 'five-hundredth' Indian blood could be in-
cluded in the descendant class.
"75
Finally, the unaffiliated half-blood class was intended to extend
the provisions of the IRA to Indians who are either unaffiliated
with a tribe or who are members of tribes not recognized by the
federal government. 76 The Senate Committee debating this bill was
fully aware that this language included within the Act Indians who
formerly had no rights at all.7 A 1935 Memorandum to John Col-
lier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, from the Assistant Solicitor,
Felix S. Cohen, specified the rights of non-tribal Indians under the
Act:
Clearly, this group [Siouan Indians of North Carolina] is not
a "recognized Indian tribe now under federal jurisdiction"
within the language of section 19. Neither are the members
of this group residents of an Indian reservation (as ofJune 1,
1934). These Indians, therefore, like many other Eastern
groups, can participate in the benefits of the Wheeler/
Howard Act only in so far as individual members may be one-
half or more Indian blood. Such members may not only par-
ticipate in the educational benefits under section 11 ... and
in the Indian preference rights for Indian Service employ-
74. See Funke, supra note 45, at 20.
75. Funke, supra note 45, at 20. The scope of the descendant class has been open to
varying interpretations. Under one interpretation, it is the descendant himself who must have
lived on a reservation onJune 1, 1934. SeeAIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 196;
Funke, supra note 45, at 27. Because this interpretation would require that the descendant
was alive in 1934 and residing on the reservation, it would thereby create a finite class of
members-few of whom would be alive today. The other interpretation suggests that it is the
member from whom the Indian descends who must have been alive and living on the reservation
in 1934. This interpretation would give rise to an open-ended descendant class that would
expand exponentially without regard to residency, tribal affiliation, or blood quantum. In
the 1970s, the AIPRC adopted the first interpretation of this provision, stating "[i]t was
readily apparent that [an open-ended descendant class] would immediately and drastically
water down the preference and virtually destroy the purposes behind the preference laws."
AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 196.
76. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 197.
77. Id.
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ment granted by section 12 ... but may also organize under
sections 16 and 17.78
This class is the hallmark of the inclusiveness of the IRA. As Col-
lier, the architect of the IRA, testified to both the Senate and the
House, "[t]he object of this definition is to include all Indian per-
sons who, by reason of residence, are definitely members of Indian
groups, as well as persons who are Indians by reason of degree of
Indian blood."79
Collier strongly supported the special legal status of Indians as
crucial to their survival. ° In testimony before the Senate Commit-
tee on Indian Affairs, Collier indicated that a major objective of
the IRA was continuing federal support for both persons who were
Indian by virtue of degree of Indian blood and persons who were
Indian by virtue of residence on a reservation and participation in
a unique Indian culture.8'
At the same time, however, the "all other persons" provision re-
stricted the number of recipients in this category by requiring a
high degree of Indian blood. In Circular No. 3123, dated Novem-
ber 18, 1935, Collier explained the definition of "Indian" set forth
in section 19 of the IRA: "The above language shows on the part of
Congress a definite policy to limit the application of Indian bene-
fits, under the Indian Reorganization Act, to those who are Indians
by virtue of actual tribal affiliation or by virtue of possessing one-
half degree or more Indian blood."
8 2
Although, as discussed above, many statutes use other defini-
tions of "Indian," the IRA criteria remain the underpinning of
many BIA rules governing eligibility. 3 This is the case because sec-
tion 19 of the IRA applies wherever an "Indian" is defined as any
person who is "considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an
78. Funke, supra note 45, at 26 (quoting an unpublished memorandum from Felix S.
Cohen, Assistant Solicitor, Dep't of the Interior, to John Collier, Commissioner of Indian
Affairs (Apr. 8, 1935)).
79. Id.
80. See BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 71-72; DEBO, supra note 28, at 353-54 (describing
Collier's passionate commitment to the preservation of Indian culture).
81. See generally Funke, supra note 45, at 19-32 (discussing Senate hearings regarding
section 19 of the IRA).
82. John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, Membership in Indian Tribes, Cir-
cular 3123 (Nov. 13, 1985) [hereinafter Circular No. 3123], quoted in AIPRC TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 68, at 200.
83. SeeAIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 110.
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Indian for any purpose, ' 4 a phrase that frequently appears in BIA
regulations.
B. BIA: Keepers of the Blood Quantum
Shortly after the IRA was passed in 1934, the BIA was charged
with devising a method to certify individuals who claimed to be
half-blood Indian. The Bureau based its determination on five fac-
tors: 1) tribal rolls; 2) testimony of the applicant; 3) affidavits from
people familiar with the applicant; 4) findings of an anthropolo-
gist; and 5) testimony of the applicant that he has retained "a
considerable measure of Indian culture and habits of living."8 5 As
explained in a 1936 memo written by Collier, "Determination of
the degree of Indian blood is entirely dependent on circumstantial
evidence; there is no known sure or scientific proof. Nor has any
legal standard of universal applicability been set up by statute for
the determination of who is, and who is not, an Indian.
''
"
6
According to BIA internal documents, persons either capable of
establishing their Indian ancestry or "exhibiting sufficient 'Indian'
physical characteristics to be equated with possession of one-half
or more degree Indian blood""' were told they were entitled to
benefits established by the IRA.8
In fact, physical characteristics were such an important part of
this determination that, in 1936, the BIA sent Harvard anthro-
pologist Carl Seizer to Robeson County, North Carolina, to settle
the mystery of whether a group named the Lumbee was in fact In-
dian. 9 He measured their features and put a pencil in each
Indian's hair, noting "Indian" blood if the pencil slipped
through and "Negroid" if it did not.90 The "diagnoses" were based
solely on physical characteristics. The absurd results of his study
listed children as Indian while omitting their parents and placed
brothers and sisters on opposite sides of the half-blood line. Of
84. Letter from Thomas M. Boyd, Assistant Attorney General, to Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, Chairman of the Select Committee on Indian Affairs 2 (Jan. 30, 1989) [hereinafter
Boyd Letter] (on file with author).
85. Memorandum from John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of
the Interior 2 (Sept. 22, 1936) (on file with author) (regarding registration as an "Indian" in
accordance with section 19 of the Indian Reorganization Act).
86. Id. at 1.
87. Keep Memo of 1981, supra note 64, at 3.
88. Id.
89. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 64.
90. Id.
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the 209 Indians Seizer "diagnosed," he concluded that only
twenty-two were Indians.9'
Five decades after the passage of the IRA, however, the BIA was
still stumbling over how to determine blood quantum. In a 1981
memorandum from Scott Keep, Assistant Solicitor of the Depart-
ment of the Interior (DOI), to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Indian Affairs, Keep acknowledged that the Bureau had no admin-
istrative procedure for determining blood quantum and was
handling such decisions on a case-by-case basis.92 The memo stated,
"[w]e strongly recommend that the Bureau establish, or more ac-
curately re-establish, an administrative decision procedure to
determine whether individuals claiming eligibility for IRA benefits
actually possess one-half degree Indian blood."93
Despite this recommendation, the BIA's efforts lagged. In 1986,
the Department of the Interior's own Board of Indian Appeals
reprimanded the BIA for its "hidden regulations" regarding how
blood quantum is determined. 94 Seventy-nine-year-old Morgan
Underwood challenged a BIA decision lowering his blood quan-
tum from full-blood Chickasaw Indian to half-blood.95 In 1975,
Underwood had received a BIA certificate of degree of Indian
blood (CDIB) showing that he was full-blood Chickasaw Indian.96
In 1983, when he applied to the BIA to get a card-sized CDIB to
replace his larger certificate, the BIA reviewed his blood quantum
and determined that it should be decreased.97 The BIA made this
change based on the fact that Underwood was illegitimate and
there had been no judicial determination of paternity.9 8 The
Agency was not persuaded by the fact that decades before he had
applied for and been granted a birth certificate from the state of
Oklahoma attesting to the identity of his father, a full-blood
Chickasaw. 99 Instead, the BIA suggested that the birth certificate
was a forgery.109
The court sharply criticized the BIA for the covert way in which
it made its blood quantum determinations, never publishing the
procedures in the Federal Register nor giving notice to Indians of
91. Id. at 64-65.
92. Keep Memo of 1981, supra note 64, at 3.
93. Id. at 1.
94. Underwood v. Deputy Ass't Sec'y-Indian Affairs, 93 Interior Dec. 13, 23 (1986).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 15.
97. Id.
98. Id. at 16.
99. Id. at 15.
100. Id.
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the methods by which it made CDIB determinations. 'O The court
reversed the BIA's determination and ordered it to issue Under-
wood a CDIB card stating he was full-blood Chickasaw.
0 2
In its eagerness to apply the blood quantum, the BIA has time
and again proceeded without formally publishing its certification
procedures as is required under the Administrative Procedures
Act.10 3 Even more seriously, it has repeatedly exceeded its adminis-
trative authority by imposing a blood quantum where the
authorizing statute provided for a different, and often more gen-
erous, definition of "Indian."'0° As far back as 1938, Nathan
Margold, Solicitor General of the DOI, had to prevent the "Indian
Office" from imposing a blood quantum in issuing loans to indi-
vidual Indians under the Oklahoma Welfare Act (OWA). ' 5 The
OWA made credit available to all Indians regardless of their blood
quantum.0 6 At the time, the Agency staff was concerned that appli-
cations for loans were being made by people "with a very small
degree of Indian blood."0 7 The staff complained that it was unable
to provide enough supervision and assistance to handle applica-
tions from "unrestricted Indians". 8 and that "credit funds [were]
entirely inadequate to provide credit for all the Indian appli-
cants."' 9
Margold issued an opinion stating that the OWA made no dis-
tinction among Indian applicants on the basis of blood quantum.
Rather, he pointed out that the Agency staff had discretion to re-
quire full security for the loans based only on the past
performance of the borrower, not on the degree of Indian
blood.''
More recently, the BIA attempted to make a similar argument in
Zarr v. Barlow,"' when it stated that, even if it could not use a blood
quantum for educational loans, it was "reasonable to base eligibil-
ity for outright grants, which have no payback requirements, on
the more restrictive standard."" 2 Zarr is a singular example of the
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id.
103. Cf 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-553 (1994) (requiring agencies to publish requirements and
other materials on which they rely).
104. See Funke, supra note 45, at 3.
105. 25 U.S.C. §§ 501-509 (1994); Loans-Preference-Degree of Indian Blood, 1 Op.
Solicitor Gen., Dep't of the Interior 828, 828 (1938), available at 1938 WL 6884.
106. 25 U.S.C. § 506 (1994).
107. 1 Op. Solicitor Gen., Dep't of the Interior at 828.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 829.
111. 800 F.2d 1484 (9th Cir. 1986).
112. Id. at 1490.
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BIA's overzealous use of the blood quantum. The Zarr court held
that the BIA's one-quarter blood requirement for Indian higher
education grants did not conform with the Indian Financing Act of
1974.113 The plaintiff, a student named Barbara Zarr, was certified by
the BIA as having 7/32 Pomo Indian blood.'1 4 The Indian Financing
Act defines "Indian" as "any person who is a member of any Indian
tribe ... which is recognized by the Federal Government as eligi-
ble for services from the [BLA]."" The BIA's regulation, on the
other hand, provides that "[f1unds appropriated by Congress for
the education of Indians may be used for making educational
loans and grants to aid students of one-fourth or more degree of
Indian blood." 16 The BIA denied Zarr's application for higher
education grants because she did not meet the eligibility criteria
outlined in 25 C.F.R. § 40.1." 7
The court in Zarr held that blood quantum could not be the
sole eligibility criterion and that the BIA's regulation "ignores the
plain language and intent of the Indian Financing Act, and the
agency is not free to ignore the statute and continue to administer
the various loan programs under whatever standard it believes is
correct or expedient."18 The court pointed out that where Con-
gress has made blood quantum a criterion of eligibility, it has
expressly indicated that blood quantum is the determining crite-
ria. " 9 According to the court:
In the absence of express language ... demonstrating that
Congress intended to make distinctions among Indians who
are tribal members but who have different degrees of Indian
blood, it would thwart every indication of congressional in-
tent to permit the BIA to rely on its power to "fill any gap left"
... to support its use of the discredited restrictive standard.
2 0
113. Id. at 1493.
114. Id. at 1485.
115. Id. at 1490 n.5 (alteration in original).
116. Id. at 1487 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 40.1).
117. Id. at 1485.
118. Id. at 1490. After Zarr was handed down, the BIA amended 25 C.F.R. § 40.1 in an
internal BIA memorandum. The regulation was again invalidated, however, based on the
fact that the BIA did not follow notice and comment rulemaking. Malone v. Bureau of In-
dian Affairs, 38 F.3d 433, 440 (9th Cir. 1994). The current regulations define an Indian as a
person "of one-fourth or more degree of Indian blood.., who reside[s] within the exterior
boundaries of Indian reservations under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs or
on trust or restricted lands under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Indian Affairs." 25 C.F.R.
§ 40.1 (2000).
119. Zair, 800 F.2d at 1492.
120. Id. (citation omitted).
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The Zarr court based its position on a similar holding issued by
the United States Supreme Court in Morton v. Ruiz, 2' a case which
did not concern the blood quantum, but rather a regulation that
restricted welfare benefits to Indians living on a reservation when
the Congressional appropriation used the language "on or near" a
reservation. 22 In Ruiz, the Court explicitly recognized the Bureau's
authority to craft regulations to address its funding resources:
[I]f there were only enough funds appropriated to provide
meaningfully for 10,000 needy Indian beneficiaries and the
entire class of eligible beneficiaries numbered 20,000, it
would be incumbent upon the BIA to develop an eligibility
standard to deal with this problem, and the standard, if ra-
tional and proper, might leave some of the class otherwise
encompassed by the appropriation without benefits.'
23
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court went on to invalidate the BIA's
regulation concerning blood quantum because, as in Zarr, it im-
posed restrictions that Congress did not intend.
24
C. The Indian Hiring Preference: An Equal Protection Nightmare?
Perhaps the greatest example of how the blood quantum has
come to dominate the eligibility debate is its role in the federal
government's Indian hiring preference. The hiring preference is
set forth in section 12 of the IRA, which provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is directed to establish standards
of health, age, character, experience, knowledge, and ability
for Indians who may be appointed to the various positions
maintained, now or hereafter, by the Indian Office, in the
administration of functions or services affecting any Indian
tribe. Such qualified Indians shall hereafter have the prefer-
ence to appointment to vacancies in any such positions.
125
This was not the first time that Congress enacted a hiring pref-
erence statute. Numerous statutes provided for employment
121. 415 U.S. 199 (1974).
122. Id. at 207.
123. Id. at 231.
124. Id. at 237.
125. 25 U.S.C. § 472 (1994).
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preferences for Indians prior to 1934, and the general policy of
giving Indians preference in employment dates back as far as
1834.126 None of those early statutes defined the term "Indian,"
however, but spoke only of "Indians" or "persons of Indian de-
scent." 27 In 1929, the Civil Service Commission approved the first
limitation on Indian hiring preferences by requiring that any can-
didate be at least one-quarter Indian blood and registered at an
Indian agency. 28 In 1934, two months prior to the passage of the
IRA, President Roosevelt signed an Executive Order amending the
Civil Service rules to include positions that could be filled by Indi-
ans of one-quarter blood with a non-competitive examination.
' 21
That Order contained the first formal declaration of the quarter-
blood requirement.3 °
Still unhappy with the notion that the Indians would be subject
to the discretion of officials acting under the Civil Service laws,
Congress designed section 12 to exempt Indians from Civil Service
laws and "put an end to the absolute discretion vested in the ex-
ecutive and administrative officials and revest the Indian tribes
with the sovereign powers which the federal government had
usurped from them." 3 ' The goal was to create a system of self-
government and self-determination, and the hiring preference was
seen as critical to achieving that goal.1
2
Although the preference itself contains no definition of
"Indian," section 19 of the IRA clearly defines the term for the
purposes of all the provisions of the Act, including the hiring pref-
erence.133 Nevertheless, for many years the BIA operated with its
own set of procedures. The BIA never published these procedures,
which were contained only in the internal BIA Manual. The BIA
procedures required that "' [t]o be eligible for preference, an indi-
vidual must be one-fourth or more degree Indian blood and be a
member of a Federally recognized tribe.' ,'4 The Indian Health
Service (IHS) also had a hiring preference that imposed a one-
fourth blood requirement. 35 This requirement was also never for-
mally published but was set forth only in an IHS circular, which
126. 25 U.S.C. § 45 (1994); AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 106; Funke,
supra note 45, at 8.
127. E.g., 25 U.S.C. §§ 44, 46-47 (1994).
128. Funke, supra note 45, at 8-9.
129. Id. at 9 (citing Exec. Order No. 6676 (Apr. 14,1934)).
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id. at 18.
134. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
135. Id. at 6.
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cited as authority all the general preference statutes and a 1939
Executive Order issued by President Roosevelt. 36
The BIA Manual and the IHS Circular thus clearly imposed re-
strictions on the definition of "Indian" which section 19 of the IRA
does not. As discussed above, section 19 provides that the IRA
benefits apply to members of tribes under federal jurisdiction (i.e.
members of federally recognized tribes, irrespective of their blood
quantum), to members' descendants who were living on reserva-
tions on June 1, 1934 (irrespective of the descendant's own tribal
membership or blood quantum), and to unaffiliated Indians of
one-half degree Indian blood (Indians who need not be a member
of any tribe) .I37 Under the BIA procedures, full-fledged tribal
members of less than one-fourth Indian blood were ineligible, as
were the half bloods and descendants who were not enrolled in
any tribe.lss
The BLA's use of the one-quarter blood quantum for the hiring
preference was condemned in 1977 by the Task Force on Law Re-
vision, Consolidation, and Codification of the American Indian
Policy Review Commission (AIPRC). s In its view, the Bureau had
gone beyond its authority by "assum[ing] the discretion to alter
the definition of 'Indian.' , 40 Furthermore, the Task Force criti-
cized the BIA and IHS for not publishing the eligibility criteria in
violation of the Administrative Procedures Act.
141
In reaching its conclusion, the Task Force drew on a 1975 case,
Whiting v. United States, 42 in which a member of the Rosebud Sioux
Tribe who was less than one-fourth blood quantum successfully
challenged the BIA hiring criteria.1 43 The BIA had turned to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) to help it defend the case, but the
Department said the case was indefensible.44 With no options left,
136. Id. at 18 (citing Exec. Order No. 8043 (Jan. 30, 1939)); see also AIPRC TASK FORCE
REPORT, supra note 68, at 108.
137. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
138. Funke, supra note 45, at 18-19.
139. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 189-92. The mission of the AIPRC
was a comprehensive investigation and study of Indian affairs with the goal of strenghtening
tribal governments so that tribes would fully represent their members and guarantee the
rights of individual Indians at the same time. See AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68,
at 3-9 (detailing the mission and goals of the AIPRC).
140. Funke, supra note 45, at 36. Karl A. Funke was a member of the AIPRC Task Force
and many of the conclusions set forth in his 1976 article, cited supra note 45, were adopted
by the Task Force in its final report. See generally AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68,
at 49-153 (detailing the recommendations of the AIPRC regarding the revision of title 25).
141. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 194-95.
142. Whiting v. United States, Civ. No. 75-3007 (D.S.D. 1975), cited in AIPRC TASK
FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 195.
143. Id.
144. Id.
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the BIA entered into a consent decree and changed its procedures
to conform to section 19.145
The result of the court ruling and the AIPRC findings was the
enactment of 25 C.F.R. § 5.1, the rule that still governs the Indian
employment preference today.146 The irony of 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 is
that, according to the Supreme Court in Morton v. Mancari,14 7 de-
cided the year before Whiting, the hiring preference that passed
constitutional muster is the one the BIA had been using. The
Court held that the requirement of membership in a federally rec-
ognized tribe and one-quarter blood quantum (the regulation
contained in the BLA Manual) was a political rather than racial
preference granted to Indians "as members of quasi-sovereign
tribal entities." 48 The Court stated that, "[t]he preference is not
directed towards a 'racial' group consisting of 'Indians'; instead, it
applies only to members of 'federally recognized' tribes. This op-
erates to exclude many individuals who are racially to be classified
as 'Indians.' In this sense, the preference is political rather than
racial in nature."
49
The implication is that a race-based criterion such as a blood
quantum is acceptable only as long as it is linked to the require-
ment of membership in a federally recognized tribe. In other
words, the inclusion of the political criterion operates to save the
racial criterion and thus the preference.' 50
Not long after the BIA promulgated 25 C.F.R. § 5.1, however,
the potential equal protection concerns of the raced-based criteria
became obvious to other governmental agencies to which the hir-
ing preference regulation also applied. In 1988, the Office of
Legal Counsel (OLC) issued an opinion advising the Acting Gen-
eral Counsel of the Department of Education (DOE) that 25
C.F.R. § 5.1 was unconstitutional.15 ' A year later, the DOJ sent a
letter to Senator Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Select Com-
mittee on Indian Affairs, reaching the same conclusion.
52
145. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 195.
146. Funke, supra note 45, at 37. The language of 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 is almost identical to
that of section 19 of the IRA.
147. 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
148. Id. at 554.
149. Id. at 553 n.24.
150. See Boyd Letter, supra note 84, at 4 n.4.
151. Letter from Manuel Lujan, Jr., Secretary of the U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to Rich-
ard Thornburgh, Attorney General 1 (Mar. 16, 1990) [hereinafter Lujan Letter] (on file
with author).
152. Id.
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At issue was the Indian hiring preference governing personnel
actions within the DOE. The DOE's hiring preference defined In-
dian as:
A) a member of an Indian tribe, band or other organ-
ized group of Indians ... including those ...
terminated since 1940 and those recognized by the
state in which they reside,
B) a descendant, in the first or second degree, of an
individual described in subparagraph (A),
C) considered by the Secretary of the Interior to be an
Indian for any purpose,
D) an Eskimo, Aleut, or other Alaska Native, or
E) is determined to be an Indian under regulations
promulgated by the Secretary [of Education] after
consultation with the National Advisory Council on
Indian Education.
153
The DOJ concluded that the Act contained three provisions that
were completely race-based: "a descendant, in the first or second
degree," the provision regarding "Eskimo, Aleut, or other Alaska
Native," and, where subsection C incorporated by reference 25
C.F.R. § 5.1, the criteria of persons "of one-half or more Indian
blood.",54 The position of the DOE on the preference was clearly
stated in the letter:
We believe that the preference granted by the Act to those
who are actual members of an Indian tribe is constitutional under
Morton v. Mancari .... Those preferences for Indians, how-
ever, that do not depend, even in part, upon membership in
an Indian tribe, but rather depend solely upon being a per-
son of the Indian racial group, are not justified under that
155decision ....
After an in-depth analysis of Supreme Court precedent regard-
ing the unconstitutionality of racial classifications, the DOJ found
that the race-based criteria were not narrowly tailored. In addition,
the race-based criteria did not, in the case of the Eskimo and Aleut
racial groups, remedy past discrimination, and the classifications
"trammel[ed] the rights of innocent third parties. ", 56 The letter
153. 25 U.S.C. § 2651 (1988) (repealed 1994).
154. 25 C.F.R. 5.1(d).
155. Boyd Letter, supra note 84, at 2 (emphasis added).
156. Id. at 8.
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concluded, "[a] ccordingly, we believe that the racial classifications
contained in [25 C.F.R. § 5.1] are unconstitutional under Supreme
Court precedent, even assuming a history of discrimination against
Indians."'5 ' The Department suggested that the Secretary of Educa-
tion apply only the constitutional part of the preference and that it
adopt additional regulations defining Indian for purposes of the
preference. 158
A dispute between the DOI and the DOE regarding the consti-
tutionality of the hiring preference emerged as a result of this
letter. 15 9 Outraged that the DOE was consulting the DOJ on the
constitutionality of 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 behind its back, Secretary of the
Interior Manuel Lujan wrote to Attorney General Richard Thorn-
burgh in March of 1990, emphatically defending the blood
quantum requirement.6 ° Secretary Lujan stated:
If, as OLC contends, a blood quantum requirement is uncon-
stitutional per se, those tribes with blood quantum
requirements in their constitutions will be exposed to signifi-
cant legal challenges since the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA)
incorporates a guarantee of equal protection similar to the
Equal Protection provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment
.... Additionally, since nearly 40% of the Indian tribal enti-
ties we deal with do not have any formally approved
governing document or, indeed, any written governing
document at all which would define tribal membership, we
have no clear, objective standard for determining who is enti-
fled to services.1
6 1
A note of near panic can be detected in Secretary Lujan's lan-
guage:
The OLC has informed us that it intends to send recommen-
dations concerning this issue to the White House soon. I
157. Id.
158. Id. at 8-9.
159. See Lujan Letter, supra note 151, at 1-2.
160. Id.
161. Id. Secretary Lujan argues that if the blood quantum is held to be unconstitutional
tribes will be open to equal protection challenges. This argument is dubious at best, based
on the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978). The
Court not only affirmed a tribe's right to define its own membership, but it also held that
the only federal court remedy explicitly provided for in the Indian Civil Rights Act is a writ
of habeas corpus to test the legality of detention by a tribe. 436 U.S. at 72 n.32. Thus, a suc-
cessful equal protection challenge in federal court, by an Indian against a tribe, seems
unlikely.
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believe the White House would not be well served if it were
asked to take action without the advice of the federal agency
that has the greatest experience and responsibility concern-
ing the issue.
The DOJ's opinion clearly put the BIA in a bind. If it was to fol-
low the advice of the OLC and come up with non-race-based
criteria for the preference, the BIA might find itself once again
facing a court challenge or congressional reprimand for ignoring
the language and intent of the IRA. Yet, if the BIA was to continue
implementing the IRA definition, it would be knowingly violating
the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. In the inter-
vening decade since the DOJ called the regulations
unconstitutional, the BIA has taken the path of least resistance,
continuing to rely on 25 C.F.R. § 5.1. The only way out of the regu-
lation at this point is for the Supreme Court to squarely confront
25 C.F.R. § 5.1, and its section 19 blueprint, and invalidate the
race-based provisions of both based on the equal protection guar-
antees of the Fifth Amendment.
III. STAYING AWAY FROM RACE: RELYING ON
THE POLITICAL RELATIONSHIP
Due to the constitutional implications of race-based eligibility
criteria,163 as well as concerns for tribal sovereignty, Congress has
162. Lujan Letter, supra note 151, at 2.
163. The question remains whether the race-based provisions of section 19 of the IRA
could withstand a constitutional challenge. Under the rationale set forth in Morton v. Man-
carl, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), and recent equal protection cases, such as Adarand Constructors,
Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995), the IRA probably would not survive. Given the Supreme
Court's recent opinion in Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000), it seems possible that the
Court may go out of its way to avoid subjecting the racial classifications of the IRA to the
rigors of strict scrutiny.
The federal government's sovereign-to-sovereign relationship with Indian tribes is
grounded in the "Indian Commerce Clause" which has been construed to authorize the
United States to enter into treaties with tribes and enact legislation concerning them. U.S.
CONST. art I, § 8. Mancari stands for the proposition that programs that benefit a politically-
defined indigenous group need only meet the rational basis test. See Delaware Tribal Bus.
Comm'n v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 83-85 (1977). As long as the classification invokes the sov-
ereign-to-sovereign relationship government has with the tribes, then federal programs
giving benefits to Indians are constitutional. If, however, racial classifications are invoked,
they are considered to be outside the holding of Mancari and are subject to the strict scru-
tiny given to racial classifications in non-Indian contexts. See Boyd Letter, supra note 84, at 6.
The vulnerability of race-based Indian preferences becomes especially evident in light of
the Supreme Court's recent decision in Rice, 528 U.S. at 495. By a 7-2 vote, the Court struck
down a Hawaiian voting scheme that allowed only native Hawaiians to vote for nine trustees
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moved away from blood quantum and descent requirements and
moved to a "political" definition. Legislation increasingly identifies
an Indian according to his or her political status, as a member of a
federally recognized tribe. As discussed above, "Indian" has be-
come a two-part definition which first identifies an "Indian" as
someone who is a member of an Indian tribe and then identifies
an "Indian tribe" as any tribe, band, nation, or organized Indian
community recognized by the United States.'6 By the mid-1990s,
just over one million men and women met this criterion.
6
1
The government, along with some tribes, prefers this definition
because, ostensibly, it avoids the pitfalls of racial classifications and
puts the determination of "Indianness" in the hands of the tribes
who decide who qualifies for membership. But this definition is no
panacea. The old concerns about racial criteria and BIA domina-
tion are still lurking in the background due to the federal
government's role in telling tribes which ones it will recognize and
what their membership requirements must be. Furthermore, the
definition leaves out as many as half a million Indians who receive
no benefits because they are unenrolled members of a federally
recognized tribe, or full-fledged members of tribes that have never
.been recognized, or whose recognition was terminated by the gov-
ernment in the 1950s.166 So to the extent that this definition
satisfies the Mancari test, it also sacrifices the inclusiveness that was
a basic tenet of the IRA.
The shift to this "political" definition began in the 1970s, when
President Nixon stated that the goal of any new Indian policy must
who administer trust programs for the benefits of both native and non-native Hawaiians. Id.
at 524. The statute defined "Hawaiian" as "any descendent of not less than one-half part of
the races inhabiting the Hawaiian Islands previous to 1778" and "the descendants of such
blood quantum of such aboriginal peoples which exercised sovereignty and subsisted in the
Hawaiian Islands in 1778 and which peoples thereafter continued to reside in Hawaii." Id. at
516 (quoting HAw. REv. STAT. § 10-2 (1993)). According to the Court, "[a]ncestry can be a
proxy for race. The ancestral inquiry mandated by the State implicates the same grave con-
cerns as a classification specifying a particular race by name." Id. at 514-17.
It is significant, however, that Rice was decided on voting rights grounds and not on equal
protection grounds. This suggests that a majority of justices was not prepared to sustain
Rice's claim that the racial classification violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights. See
George Will, Island of Equal Protection, WASH. POST, Mar. 2, 2000, at A19. Perhaps, the Jus-
tices were thinking of the words of Justice Blackmun in Mancari: "If these laws ... were
deemed invidious racial discrimination, an entire Title of the United States Code (25
U.S.C.) would be effectively erased .... " Mancari, 417 U.S. at 552. Whether the Court had
in mind the eligibility implications for millions of Indians had they ruled on equal protec-
tion grounds, at least for now, 25 C.F.R. § 5.1 and section 19 of the IRA seem safe from
challenge.
164. See supra Part II.C.
165. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 67.
166. See id.
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be "to strengthen the Indian's sense of autonomy without
threatening his sense of community. And we must make it clear
that Indians can become independent of Federal control without
being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support.1 67 The
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 19 75 '68
was the most pivotal legislation of that era and set the stage for a
transfer of authority to the tribes for administering federal grants
and programs that benefit Indians.' 69 It was during this period that
the AIPRC produced its thorough and scathing study of federal
Indian policy.' 70 Since that time, according to Senator Daniel K.
Inouye, Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Indian
Affairs, "[s] overeignty, the inherent right of self-government and
self-determination, is the focal point in all Indian issues."
7
1
Congress's new consciousness became evident as early as 1974,
172with the Indian Financing Act (IFA). With the IFA, Congress at-
tempted to consolidate under one uniform standard numerous
IRA loan and grant programs, which by the 1970s incorporated
conflicting eligibility provisions. For example, revolving loan fund
provisions set up under the IRA in 1939 and 1948 required a one-
quarter blood quantum requirement, which obviously conflicted
with section 19 of the IRA.173 The intent of Congress was to rede-
fine eligible Indians under a more inclusive standard.' 74 In doing
so, Congress, in enacting the IRA, rejected a definition based on a
one-quarter blood quantum in favor of the standard of member-
ship in a recognized tribe.'
75
This definitional shift has also made its way into some regula-
tions governing Indian eligibility. For example, in 1987, when
creating rules governing eligibility for IHS services, the Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services (HHS) promulgated
42 C.F.R. § 36.12176 The rule states that an eligible person must be
(1) a member of a federally recognized Indian tribe and (2) reside
within a designated Health Service Delivery Area. 7 7 Between the
draft rule and the final rule HHS deleted the one-quarter blood
167. Id. at 83.
168. 25 U.S.C. §§ 450 et seq. (1994).
169. See id. at 84.
170. Id.
171. Id. at85.
172. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1452 etseq. (1994).
173. See Zarr v. Barlow, 800 F.2d 1484, 1488 (9th Cir. 1986) (discussing the legislative
history of the Indian Financing Act).
174. See id.
175. See id. at 1491-92.
176. 42 C.F.R. § 36.12 (1999).
177. Id.
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quantum.'7 8 In the Federal Register, the HHS stated, "[m]any
commentators expressed concern that inclusion of a specific blood
quantum requirement would interfere with a tribe's sovereignty by
eliminating some tribal members from eligibility based upon racial
identity rather than on the political relationship which exists be-
tween tribes and the Federal government." 79 It was careful to
reserve the right to use such limiting factors in the future, how-
ever, saying "[t]he Department does not believe that any of these
arguments necessarily preclude use of a specific blood quantum as
a criteria for receipt of Federal health benefits.",
8 0
A. Federal Recognition: Who's In and Who's Out
Originally, tribes became legally recognized through treaties
with the United States government or through executive orders or
presidential proclamations.18 ' In 1934, the IRA provided unequivo-
cal federal recognition to those tribes with whom the government
already had a relationship and allowed some non-federally recog-
nized tribes to organize under its provisions and become federally
recognized. 2 In 1978, the government adopted 25 C.F.R. § 83 to
govern the process of federal acknowledgment for non-IRA
tribes. 83 Until that time, those non-federally-recognized tribes had
been "tribes" for limited purposes such as takings claims, but not
for other purposes such as eligibility for services and benefits (e.g.,
health care).8 4 With the enactment of 25 C.F.R. § 83, however, ac-
knowledged tribes were acknowledged for all purposes. ' In other
words, this regulation enabled tribes to receive all services and
benefits provided to other historically recognized tribes.'86 As of
1999, there were 558 federally recognized tribes. 87
The federal acknowledgment criteria are purely administrative,
not statutory, and are promulgated by the DOI through the Bureau
of Indian Affairs Branch of Acknowledgment and Research.'T m To
178. 52 Fed. Reg. 35,044 (Sept. 16, 1987).
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 68.
182. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 59.
183. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2000).
184. Cindy D. Padget, The Lost Indians of the Lost Colony: A Critical Legal Study of the Lum-
bee Indians of North Carolina, 21 Am. INDIAN L. REv. 391, 406 (1997).
185. 25 C.F.R. § 83 (2000).
186. Id.
187. Russell, supra note 23, at 130.
188. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 14.
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qualify for federal acknowledgment under the rule: (1) a tribe
must have been identified as an American Indian entity since 1900;
(2) it must comprise a distinct community and have existed as a
community from historical times; (3) it must have political influ-
ence over its members; (4) it must have membership criteria; and
(5) it must have a membership that consists of individuals who de-
scend from a historical Indian tribe and who are not enrolled in
any other tribe.'8 9
The DOI's position is that the process of federal acknowledg-
ment is first and foremost a political one.'90 The preamble to the
final rules in the Federal Register states: "[a]lthough petitioners
must be American Indians, groups of descendants will not be ac-
knowledged solely on a racial basis. Maintenance of tribal
relations-a political relationship-is indispensable."' 9'
Political or not, using federal recognition as a measure of
"Indianness" signals to many Indians continued government con-
trol over Indians, not deference. According to one view, the
enactment of 25 C.F.R. § 83 has made "Indianness" not an expres-
sion of tradition and history, but rather a rigid legal term that
depends on how the BIA interprets the facts a tribe presents.' 92 In
fact, many tribes that predate European contact are still not feder-
ally recognized.' 93 According to Rennard Strickland, an Indian Law
scholar,. the quest to become a federally recognized tribe is a game
played by the federal government to divide and conquer: "It]he
question of who is 'more' or 'most' Indian may draw people away
from common concerns."'" He points out that in the federal bu-
reaucracy, being considered an Indian "may have nothing to do
with who you are, how you live, what you do, what your beliefs are;
it has to do with the marriage and tribal enrollment patterns of
your parents or grandparents as interpreted by federal bureau-
crats." '95 This process leaves out many Indian tribes, including
terminated tribes whose federal recognition has not been restored
and state recognized tribes which have not been granted federal
recognition.)
189. Mandatory Criteria for Federal Acknowledgement, 25 C.F.R. § 83.7 (a)-(f) (1999).
190. Memorandum from Scott Keep, Ass't Solicitor, U.S. Dep't of the Interior, to the
Chief of the Division of Tribal Government Services 6 (Mar. 2, 1988) [hereinafter Keep
Memo of 1988] (on file with the author).
191. 43 Fed. Reg. 39,361 (Aug. 24, 1978) (codified as amended at 25 C.F.R. pt. 54).
192. Padget, supra note 184, at 406.
193. Rennard Strickland, The Genocidal Premise in Native American Law and Policy: Exorcis-
ingAboriginal Ghosts, 1 J. GENDER RACE &JUST. 325, 330 (1998).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 44.
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In the 1950s and 1960s, the federal government terminated its
relationships with numerous tribes which it deemed sufficiently
capable of self-government and thus no longer in need of federal
supervision or benefits. 97 The policy devastated the tribes, how-
ever, resulting in the alienation of trust lands and increased
authority of states over tribes, and encouraged the relocation of
Indians to urban centers. 9 Two major tribes that were terminated
were the Menominees of Wisconsin and the Klamath of Oregon.'9
As well, more than seventy smaller tribes and some thirty-eight
California rancherias (rural Indian settlements of the southwestern
U.S.) were terminated." Although federal recognition has been
restored to some of these tribes, many remain unrecognized and
thus their members are excluded from the political definition of
"Indian."
20
'
Another group of outsiders is state-recognized Indians. Ten
states, all of them in the East, have a recognition process that is
entirely independent of the federal recognition process. °2 A prime
example of a state-recognized tribe that has been repeatedly de-
nied federal recognition is the Lumbee Tribe of North Carolina. °5
The Lumbee contradict every stereotype of "Indian." Some have
blond hair and blue eyes; others have African American features.
Early visitors to their region described them as "'light-skinned In-
dians"' who farmed and dressed like Englishmen. 4 The DOI's
early studies of the Lumbee concluded that they were not Indian
because they did not look "'like Indians.' ,205 Yet, this group is so
sure of its Indian heritage that it has petitioned nine times for fed-
eral recognition. 6
Unlike many Southern tribes, such as the Cherokee, the Lum-
bee never possessed tribal rolls.07 Rather, their community
identification depends on verification by Indian records, birth cer-
tificates, and other documents acceptable to the Indian
197. Id.
198. Id. at 44-45.
199. Id. at 44
200. Id. at 62.
201. Id.
202. Id. at 63-73. The ten states are: Alabama, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Louisi-
ana, Massachusetts, North Carolina, New York, Tennessee, and Virginia.
203. Id. at 69.
204. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 63.
205. Padget, supra note 184, at 403. Indian scholars say they are a mix of early Hatteras
and Cheraw tribes, along with blacks and whites, including blue-eyed descendants of Sir
Walter Raleigh's "lost colony." Id. at 404. See also the Seizer study discussed supra Part II.B.
206. BoRUEWICH, supra note 1, at 63-64.
207. RUTH DIAL WOODS, TESTIMONY: INDIAN DEFINITION STUDY 10 (1974).
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community. 2 8 For the purposes of the federal government, this
type of documentation is not sufficient. As Ruth Dial Woods, a
Lumbee, wrote of her people in 1974 during their petition for
federal recognition, "[t]he fact that they cannot historically docu-
ment their lineage to one particular tribe does not negate their
claim to Indian descent. ' '209 Throughout their recognition struggle,
the Lumbee have come to think of themselves as the Indians that
America forgot, and they resent that they have been forced to en-
gage in "the paper chase of genealogy."
2 1 0
To insiders, those tribes that do have recognition, what is at
stake in federal acknowledgment is eligibility for scarce govern-
ment resources. Thus, these tribes have a strong interest in
thwarting groups like the Lumbee from succeeding under 25
C.F.R. § 83. When the Lumbee petitioned for recognition in 1974,
many federally recognized tribes adamantly opposed them.'
These tribes made no secret of their fear that passage of the legis-
lation would dilute services to historically recognized tribes.1 2 In a
telegram to Congressman Lloyd Meeds, John A. Crow, Principal
Chief of the Eastern Band of Cherokees, stated, "[T]hey simply
have no historical relationship with the Federal Government. To
the contrary, they have no treaties, no Federal trust land base, no
historical tribal organization, and literally thousands of persons
[are] claiming to be Lumbee Indians-who are in fact of no In-
dian lineage whatsoever."
21 3
The United Southeastern Tribes, Inc. pointed out that DOI's
records in the 1930s showed there were only twenty-two people of
half or more Indian blood among the Lumbee; by the 1970s, the
tribe was claiming 55,000 members.214 It stated: "As Indian people
we are in great sympathy with the many groups of non-Indian peo-
ple regardless of their origin who during these troubled times, find
a need to form some type of identity. However, our sympathy and
208. Id.
209. Id. The bill granting the Lumbee federal recognition, H.R. 12216, 93d Cong.
(1974), was passed by the House on October 7, 1974 and then forwarded to the Senate as S.
4045 where it was defeated. Id. at app. A at 5.
210. Id.at20.
211. Id. at app. C.
212. See id.
213. Telegram from John A. Crow, Principal Chief of the Eastern Band of Cherokees,
to Congressman Lloyd Meeds (undated), in WOODS, supra note 207, at app. C.
214. Letter from United Southeastern Tribes to Dep't of Labor 1 (Oct. 17, 1974)
(discussing the position of United Southwestern Tribes regarding the recognition of the
Lumbee as Indians) in WOODS, supra note 207, at app. C.
[VOL. 34:1&2
FALL 200-WINTER 2001]
concern cannot extend to the point of sacrificing the heritage,
tradition and culture of our people."2
At the 31st Annual Convention of the National Congress of
American Indians held at that time, the delegates voted to oppose
the Lumbee effort to gain federal tribal recognition status.
Eugene Begay, of the United Southeastern Tribes, Inc. stated,
"'[t]he long Indian struggle has been to maintain culture and
identity and to develop our resources. The basic issue is this: Who
is an Indian and who is not an Indian? It's time for us to decide,
and then to tell Congress and federal agencies our conclu-
sions.' ,211
The chairman of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe agreed. He stated,
"'[t]his issue is greater than you think. We may have from 40,000
to 79,000 persons waiting to make an onslaught on Congress-
people suddenly coming out of the woodwork. How many do we
allow to 'become' Indians, while we diminish our resources every
day?' ,,218
The irony of this struggle is that it is precisely the Lumbee,
known early in the century as the "Siouan Indians of North Caro-
lina," that Felix Cohen referred to in his 1935 memorandum as
Indians who would be considered unaffiliated half-bloods and
would definitely fall within the reach of the IRA. 19
B. Whose Definition of Membership?
Whatever political meaning federal recognition gives to this
definition of "Indian," the race-based requirements of tribal mem-
bership, and the government's role in dictating them, threaten to
take away. Furthermore, the membership requirements vary be-
tween tribes resulting in tribes that have the least restrictive
membership requirements receiving the most federal benefits.
Most tribes define tribal membership requirements in a tribal con-
stitution and implement the definition through a tribal roll. 20 Tide
25 of the U.S. Code contains scores of tribal enrollment statutes
215. * United Southwestern Tribes Position Regarding The Lumbee People's Recogni-
tion as Indians 14, in WOODS, supra note 207, at app. C.
216. Press Release, American Indian Press Association News Service 29 (undated), in
WooDs, supra note 207, at app. C.
217. Id. (quoting Eugene Begay, Navajo-Chippewa representative to the National Con-
gress of American Indians).
218. Id. at 30 (quoting Robert Burnett, Chairman of the Rosebud Sioux Tribe).
219. Funke, supra note 45, at 26.
220. Dussias, supra note 57, at 86.
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spelling out the membership criteria of various tribes. A typical
example of this type of statute is the Yakima Tribe's enrollment
statute, 25 U.S.C. § 601, which provides:
The Secretary of the Interior is authorized and directed, with
the advice and consent of the Yakima Tribal Council, to pre-
pare a roll showing the members of the Yakima Tribes ...
[which roll] shall constitute the official membership roll of
the Yakima Tribes for all purposes .... The following shall be
placed on the roll:
(a) All living persons who received allotments on the
Yakima Reservation...
(b) All living persons who are of the blood of the four-
teen original Yakima Tribes...
(c) All living persons who have maintained a domicile
... on the Yakima Reservation
(d) All children of one-fourth or more blood of the
Yakima Tribes born ... to a parent who is an en-
rolled member and maintains a domicile on the
221Yakima Reservation.
Since the days of John Collier, it has been the policy of the gov-
ernment to tell tribes to whom they should offer membership.
Collier stated:
[I] t is our opinion, and will be our policy, in connection with
the approval of constitutions and by-laws of tribes, to urge
and insist that any constitutional provision conferring auto-
matic tribal membership upon children hereafter born,
should limit such membership to persons who reasonably can
be expected to participate in tribal relations and affairs....
Where automatic membership is conferred upon children
born of mixed marriages wherein the parents reside perma-
nently away from the reservation, there should be included a
minimum requirement that such children be of at least one-
half degree of Indian blood.2
Justification for this policy was based on a paternalistic con-
cern for protecting the tribes. According to Collier, "[i]t is
important that the Indians not only shall understand this policy
221. 25 U.S.C. § 601 (1994).
222. Circular No. 3123, supra note 82.
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but shall appreciate its importance as it applies to their own wel-
fare through preventing the admission to tribal membership of a
large number of applicants of small degree of Indian blood."
223
The DOI has maintained this insistence that tribes offer mem-
bership only to those who can be expected to maintain tribal
relations. Such a view was summed up in a 1988 memorandum
from Scott Keep, Assistant Solicitor of the DOI, concerning the
authority of the Secretary to disapprove amendments to member-
ship provisions of tribal constitutions. The memorandum stated:
[W]hile it is true that membership in an Indian tribe is for
the tribe to decide, that principle is dependent on and sub-
ordinate to the more basic principle that membership in an
Indian tribe is a bilateral, political relationship. A tribe does
not have authority under the guise of determining its own
membership to include as members persons who are not
maintaining some meaningful sort of political relationship
with the tribal government.
2 2 4
The DOI has concluded that it has "broad and possibly nonre-
viewable authority" to disapprove or withhold approval of a tribal
constitutional amendment regarding membership criteria.25 The
DOI stated that it would exert this authority if a tribe amended its
constitution to grant memberships to descendants, who were not
maintaining any sort of tribal relation because that would consti-
226tute a racial criterion. It was this policy that the AIPRC strongly
criticized when it stated, "The BIA has acted to undermine tribal
governments by... usurping one of the most basic powers of self-
government-the right to determine membership, by condition-
ing BIA funding on BIA-determined membership requirements."
27
The Supreme Court, on the other hand, has affirmed the power
of tribal governments to set their own criteria for membership due
to the political and sovereign nature of the tribe. In Santa Clara
Pueblo v. Martinez, the Court stated, "[a] tribe's right to define its
own membership for tribal purposes has long been recognized as
central to its existence as an independent political community.,
229
223. Id.
224. Keep Memo of 1988, supra note 190, at 6.
225. Id. at 7.
226. Id.
227. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 189.
228. Roffv. Burney, 168 U.S. 218, 223 (1897); Patterson v. Council of Seneca Nation,
157 N.E. 734, 735 (1927); see also Waldron v. United States, 143 F. 413 (C.C.D.S.D. 1905);
COHEN, supra note 13, at 26.
229. 436 U.S. 49, 72 n.32 (1978) (emphasis added).
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This language still leaves room, however, for the government to
assert authority to determine a tribe's membership when it
concerns "federal purposes," such as eligibility for governmental
benefits.
Definitions vary among the tribes, but most require blood quan-
tum or descent from a tribal member.2 30 Beyond that, tribes
require varying degrees of blood quantum for membership eligi-
bility, anywhere from one-half degree of tribal blood to no blood
requirement at all. 23 ' As a result, enrolled members of a tribe today
may include individuals who are racially non-Indian, those with
very little Indian blood, and those who are racially Indian but live
off the reservation and do not consider themselves part of the In-
dian community.
The White Mountain Apache tribe, for example, requires at
least one-half blood quantum. 23 Membership in North Carolina's
Eastern Band of Cherokee is based on as little as 1/32 degree In-
dian blood, while membership in the Tunica-Biloxi tribe requires
only 1/64 Indian blood.233 The Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma ac-
cepts anyone descended from an individual listed on the early
tribal rolls.234 The Onondaga and Seneca tribes require that mem-
bers be born to an enrolled mother.3 The Tohono O'Odham, or
Papago, Tribe of Arizona allows all children born to members of
the tribe who reside on the reservation to automatically become
members.2 36 The Lac Vieux Desert Band of the Lake Superior
Chippewa Indians base eligibility on one-quarter blood and de-
scent from a person who was listed on the census prior to 1928 or
prior to 1940.237
Despite the BIA's threats to invalidate membership criteria
based solely on descent, as of July 1991, the BIA reported that
twenty-six tribes, containing 78,530 enrolled members, did not re-
quire blood quantum for membership, but only descent from a
tribal member. Other tribes are willing to grant membership
through adoption. For example, the San Carlos Apache tribe
230. COHEN, supra note 13, at 22-23.
231. Id.
232. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 73.
233. Id. at 72.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id.
237. 25 U.S.C. § 1300h-3 (1994).
238. Bureau of Indian Affairs, U.S. Dep't of Interior, unpublished report of Tribal En-
rollment Division (July 1991) (on file with author).
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grants membership to the spouses of tribal members as long as
they have one-quarter degree Indian blood from any tribe. 9
No tribe, however, requires full-bloodedness for membership;
240
none could. In 1910, just more than half of the nation's 265,638
Indians were full-blooded, but, today, many tribes contain no full-
bloods at all. 4' Indians have the highest rate of interracial mar-
riage of any minority in America. 242 In 1970, more than thirty-three
percent of all Indians were married to non-Indians (compared to
one percent of all Americans who married outside their race) 243 A
decade later that number was fifty percent.244 A congressional study
suggested that the percentage of Indians with half or more Indian
blood would decline from about eighty-seven percent in 1980 to
just eight percent by 2080. 45
As a result of this trend, many Indians believe that it is time that
tribes dispense with the blood quantum as a criterion of member-
ship. 46 In fact, Indians marched in protest over the use of the
blood quantum in Denver in March, 1999, stating that use of a
blood quantum to determine membership disenfranchises increas-
ing numbers of mixed-blood urban youths. 47 Those Indians
objected to the fact that they are the only group in the country that
has to prove who they are with a piece of paper-the CDIB-and
that urban Indians, often the products of mixed marriages, are
241subject to discrimination. Yet, many of these urban Indians want
to be enrolled in a tribe because there are benefits to enrollment,
such as scholarships and the right to claim Indian land and receive
housing and business loans.249
A tribe's decision to rely on a blood quantum (and its decision
regarding which blood quantum to use) is frequently linked to the
struggle for tribal survival, the desire to maximize wealth or politi-
cal advantage, or other outside forces affecting the tribe. For
example, the Salish-Kootenai Tribe of Montana is composed
mainly of mixed bloods and was almost terminated in the 1950s.25°
239. Id.
240. BORDEWICH, sutpra note 1, at 73.
241. Id.
242. Gov't Mgmt. Hearings, supra note 7, at 5.
243. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 78.
244. Id.
245. Id.
246. Sheba R. Wheeler, Indian Lineage Rules Decried Tribal-Blood Limits Called Exclusion-
ay, DENV. POST, Mar. 22, 1999, at Bi.
247. Id.
248. Id.
249. Id.
250. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 123.
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The tribe's response was to tighten its blood quantum requirement
to one-quarter. At that time, the tribe saw promoting the blood
quantum over inclusiveness as an "entrenchment" strategy neces-
sary for survival . The Cherokees, on the other hand, have
remained inclusive, requiring only proof of descent from an indi-
vidual listed on the Dawes Commission Rolls. 25 They believe that a
large, dispersed mixed-blood population is crucial to achieving
political power as a tribe, and thereby protecting the full blood,
traditional Cherokees. 4 The result, however, is that each genera-
tion of the tribe becomes increasingly less Indian. 5 Like the
Cherokee, the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa requires only
descent from a member, having discarded its blood quantum re-
quirement in 1975.6 Since that time the tribe has gone from 1,300
to 21,000 members.5 7
In addition, gaming has been responsible for encouraging a re-
laxed membership standard in some tribes and a strict one in
others. For example, the Mashantuket Pequots of Connecticut,
who only require one-sixteenth Pequot blood for membership,
have been revitalized as a tribe through an influx of new members
258brought on by gaming. At one point, the tribe had only twelve
reservation residents. 2 59 Now that the tribe has become wealthy as a
result of running the most successful tribal casino in the country,
many distant relations are requesting membership. 26° According to
one report, some eight to ten people a week apply for membership
claiming they have Indian blood.26'
The Saginaw Chippewa of Mount Pleasant, Michigan, have been
plagued by conflicts over tribal membership as a result of new
26gaming income. 62 In 1993, the tribe opened a casino which now
brings in profits of more than $200 million a year, enabling the
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 105. Interestingly, ChiefJohn Ross, who led the tribe into the confrontation
with the colonists that resulted in the Trail of Tears, was the one-eighth Cherokee grandson
of a Scots trader. Russell, supra note 23, at 131.
254. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 123.
255. See id.
256. BORDEWICH, supra note 1, at 73.
257. Id. The reputation of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe for selling membership and fish-
ing rights to fishermen with no Indian blood, however, suggests that profit may have been a
motive. See id.
258. Kathryn R. L. Rand & Steven A. Light, Virtue or Vice? How IGRA Shapes the Politics of
Native American Gaming, Sovereignty, and Identity, 4 VA.J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 381, 423 (1997).
259. Id.
260. Id. at 422.
261. Id. at 423.
262. Elizabeth Amon, Case: What's U.S. Tribal Role? Feds Replace Tribal Council with Rival
but Face Court Challenge, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 8, 1999, at Al.
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tribe to pay each of its 2,800 members $30,000 a year.263 The tribal
council controls not only the award of casino contracts, but also
membership policies. 26' The situation has led to allegations of voter
fraud based on claims that individuals who are not valid members
through blood or adoption have voted in tribal elections.2 65 Re-
cently, the BIA has taken the controversial step of intervening in
the election dispute.
The Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Tribe has only one hundred
members, but it is constantly getting applications for member-
267
ship. Presumably, this increase in interest in membership derives
from their operation of the Mystic Lake Casino in Minnesota, the
268
second most profitable tribal casino. Consequently, some tribal
members have lobbied to implement a one-fourth blood quan-
tum.2 69 The irony of this situation is that gaming has spurred many
Indians living off the reservation to return, yet for tribes to main-
tain economic growth through gaming, they must limit their
population growthY.
Conflicting membership requirements have caused acrimony
between tribes, notably between the Michigan tribes. This acri-
mony was demonstrated by a recent dispute over the distribution
of tribal judgment funds.27' On one side was the Grand Traverse
Band, the Little River Band, the Bay Mills Indian Community, and
the Northern Michigan Ottawa Association, all of which require
that their members be one-quarter blood, based on the Durant
Roll of 1910. On the other side was the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians with its lineal descent requirement.Y
According to George Bennett, Chairman of the Grand Traverse
Band of Ottawa and Chippewa, in his congressional testimony in
support of H.R. 1604, a political compromise to settle the dispute,
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Rand & Light, supra note 258, at 423.
268. See id.
269. Id.; see also Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux v. Babbitt, 107 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 1997).
270. Rand & Light, supra note 258, at 423.
271. Hearings on H.R. 1604 Before the House Comm. on Resources, 105 Cong. 2 (1997)
(statement of George Bennett, Chairman of the Grand Traverse Band of Ottawa and Chip-
pewa).
272. Id. At the time the judgement was awarded in 1968, there was one federally recog-
nized Michigan tribe, the Bay Mills Indian Community, which would have been the sole
recipient. The Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Michigan Indians was recognized in 1972 under 25
U.S.C. §§ 2 and 13. In 1979, the Grand Traverse Band petitioned for recognition and later
was recognized. In 1993, the Little Traverse Band of Ottawa Indians and the Little River
Band of Ottawa Indians were federally recognized. Also, the Northern Michigan Ottawa
Association is an organization with a membership of non-recognized Indians. See id. at 1-2.
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"[t]his liberal definition [the Sault Ste. Marie definition] has had
the net effect of swelling their tribal population to some 25,000-
plus members.",73 As a result of the competing definitions, accord-
ing to Bennett, there has been a thirty-year deadlock on the
distribution of tribal funds. 74
One former board member of the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa, Beverly S. Louis, a full-blooded Chippewa who has seen
the effect of lax membership, takes a hard line against diluting the
rolls. 5 She advocates that her tribe adopt a half-blood member-
ship requirement, even if it means her own granddaughter will not
be eligible for membership. "There should be no more member-
ship unless an Indian is one-half blood quantum-as determined
by the BIA, not the tribe."276 She believes that membership in her
tribe, with the federal benefits that attend it, has become a prize
offered up to the highest bidder. As a result, she has seen the
membership rolls swell up with members who are one-thirty-
second or less Chippewa blood.7 According to Louis, if the result
of a strict blood quantum is that the tribe shrinks, so be it-
perhaps Indians will be prompted to start marrying within the
tribe.279
IV. SOLUTIONS
The history of the definition of "Indian" reflects a century-long
quest to establish the boundary criteria of federal Indian law-"the
place at which diminished Indian blood, culture, political affinity
... indicate the transition from an Indian to an American iden-
tity." 28° With so many divergent interests at stake, one thing that
does seem clear is that no single set of criteria is going to com-
pletely satisfy the government, the tribes, and "all other" Indians
for all purposes.
273. Id. at 2.
274. Id.
275. Interview with Beverly S. Louis, former board member of the Sault Ste. Marie
Chippewa Indians, in Ann Arbor, Mich. (Fall 1999).
276. Id.
277. Id.
278. Id.
279. Id.
280. Frances Svensson, Imposed Law and the Manipulation of Identity: The American Indian
Case, in THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 69, 73 (Sandra B. Burman & Barbara Harrell-Bond eds.,
1979), quoted in SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 85.
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Perhaps the closest to a workable solution that the government
and the tribes, working in tandem, have achieved is the definition
of "Indian artist" in the Indian Arts and Crafts Act of 1990.21' This
Act has addressed the sovereignty and inclusiveness problems of a
definition based on federal recognition by adding another step, a
tribal certification procedure that ensures that tribes will have final
say regarding who is considered an Indian artist.
282
A. The Arts and Crafts Act of 1990:
A Case Study
The Arts and Crafts Act of 1990 is unique among recent federal
Indian legislation because, at all stages of its enactment, it was sup-
ported and advanced by Indians. President Bush signed it into
law in 1990, and it amended previous legislation that had never
been enforced.284 The main objective of the law was to stem the
economic loss to the Indians caused by unmarked handicrafts-
285losses that were running between $400 and $800 million a year.
The Arts and Craft Act has several unique features. It defines
"Indian" as "any individual who is a member of an Indian tribe; or
for the purposes of this section is certified as an Indian artisan by an In-
dian tribe... . ,,286 The definition of "Indian tribe" extends not only
to tribes with federal recognition, but also to "any Indian group
that has been formally recognized as an Indian tribe by a State leg-
islature or by a State commission or similar organization
legislatively vested with State tribal recognition authority."28
7
The original version of the definition included no provisions for
Indians who were not members of federally recognized tribes. At a
hearing on the bill held in Santa Fe, New Mexico in 1989, how-
ever, several unenrolled Indians spoke about their situation and
281. 18 U.S.C. § 1159 (1994); 25 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
282. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (e) (d) (1994).
283. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 6.
284. Id. at 11.
285. Id. at 23. The law increased criminal penalties from the previous version and cre-
ated civil penalties for its violation. The Act further directs the Arts and Crafts Board (an
agency of the Department of the Interior, but not part of the BIA) to "promote the eco-
nomic welfare of the Indian tribes and Indian individuals through the development of
Indian arts and crafts and the expansion of the market of the products of Indian art and
craftsmanship." 25 U.S.C. § 305a (1994).
286. 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c)(1) (1994) (emphasis added); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d)(2) (1994)
(emphasis added).
287. 18 U.S.C. § 1159(c) (3) (B) (1994); 25 U.S.C. § 305e(d) (3) (B) (1994).
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tribal leaders were sympathetic to their situation.88 One Indian
artist, whose father is a Seneca and mother is a non-Indian and
who was raised on the Seneca reservation, testified as follows:
Among my father's people, enrollment numbers are assigned
through blood descent in the mother's line .... I do not
question the rights of the tribes to set whatever criteria they
want for enrollment eligibility; but in my view, that is the ex-
tent of their rights, to say who is an enrolled Seneca or
Mohawk or Navajo or Cheyenne or any other tribe. Since
there are mixed bloods with enrollment numbers and some
of those with very small percentages of genetic Indian ances-
try, I don't feel they have the right to say to those of us
without enrollment numbers that we are not of Indian heri-
tage, only that we are not enrolled.
.... To say that I am not [Indian] and to prosecute me for
telling people of my Indian heritage is to deny me some of my
civil liberties ... and constitutes racial discrimination. 9
Responding to this testimony, the legislators searched for a
more inclusive definition and consulted with the DOJ to ensure its
constitutionality. According to Gail K. Sheffield in her book The
Arbitrary Indian, "[m]aking the tribes, through the certification
provision, the arbiters of who is a (nonenrolled) Indian was done
in accordance with Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, in which the
United States Supreme Court upheld the right of a tribe to deter-
mine its own membership."2 Also, congressmen from the eastern
states that recognized tribes lobbied for the inclusion of state-
recognized tribes.29'
One issue that arose before the 1996 regulations went into effect
was whether a tribe could certify a non-Indian as a tribal artist. The
Yankton Sioux tribe of South Dakota had certified a man who was
adopted by a traditional family on the reservation, spoke the native
language, and had spent much of his youth as an apprentice to his
uncle, an internationally known Dakota bead artist. 2 The regula-
tions resolved this issue by requiring that, in order to be certified,
288. SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 25, 28-29.
289. Id. at 26-27.
290. Id. at 29.
291. Id.
292. Id. at 103-04.
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an individual must be of the tribe's lineage, and the tribe may not
charge a fee for certification. 9
In the final analysis, some Indians saw the Act as a step forward
for sovereignty and others disagreed. An Indian Arts and Crafts
Board commissioner stated that the statute expanded the sover-
eign power of the tribes because it provides them with another
form of membership for non-member Indians. 4 To him, the Act
went beyond the blood quantum and encompassed "community
recognition" within the "official" definition of "Indian. '295 Other
Indians saw the law as eroding the principle that Indian tribes have
sole discretionary authority over their citizenry.26
The certification concept, while inclusive, raises some unan-
swered questions. For example, what authority will tribes have over
non-members they certify? Can artists who are denied certification
challenge the tribes? Should state-recognized tribes be put on the
same footing as federally recognized tribes?297 Furthermore, al-
though the tribes are now the arbiters of "Indianness," as the
regulations explicitly state, certification is still based on one of the
criteria called unconstitutional by the DOJ a decade ago: Indian
descent.
2 9 8
B. Other Solutions: From a Uniform Blood
Quantum to Self-Identification
Many solutions to the inconsistent standards of Indian identity
have been offered up throughout the years. In 1976, a Health,
Education and Welfare Department Task Force Report suggested
that "revision of some statutes to redefine the term 'Indian' to
eliminate the connotation of race might eliminate the qualms felt
by some courts in passing upon the constitutional basis for assis-
tance to Indians."m
A year later the AIPRC Task Force issued its final recommenda-
tions based on suggestions it received from chiefs and spokesmen
293. Id. at 103.
294. Id. at 122.
295. Id. at 122-23.
296. Id. at 122.
297. Id. at 130.
298. Id.
299. THE CHANGING LEGAL STATUS OF THE TRIBAL INDIAN, REG'L TASK FORCE ON IN-
DIAN AFFAIRS, REP. TO THE DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE REGION VIII, DENV.,
COLO. 12 (1976).
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of the Five Civilized Tribes in Oklahoma. 300 The tribes advocated a
uniform one-quarter blood quantum, applicable to all the provi-
sions of section 19 of the IRA, to alleviate the unfairness that
results from the tribes' varying standards of membership.&' The
AIPRC's recommendation included the lowering of the one-half
blood quantum requirement of the unaffiliated Indians to one-
quarter blood quantum. 3°1 Obviously, this solution does little to
cure the constitutional problems of the IRA, and an across-the-
board blood quantum would no doubt exacerbate the sovereignty
and self-determination concerns of many tribes.
A slightly more inclusive standard favored by some is member-
ship in an Indian tribe-including non-recognized, terminated,
and state-recognized tribes-along with a one-quarter blood quan-
tum. 3 3 While this definition meets the Mancari test3 0 4 and expands
the definition to include tribes that don't have federal recognition,
it still leaves unenrolled Indians, like the mixed-blood urban
3051youths who protested in Denver, without benefits, and it certainly
overrides tribal definitions of membership.
An option at the other end of the spectrum is self-
identification-the Census model. Self-identification, unlike the
blood-quantum, is free from government assumptions about what
race is because no one is telling the individual what it means to be
an "Indian" when he or she selects that category. 6 In Russell
Thornton's view:
[W]hat seems important ... is that American Indians be al-
lowed to do their own defining, either as individuals or as
tribes. This may occur on the individual level through self-
identification; it may occur on the tribal level through formal
membership. One may object that self-identification allows
considerable variation among individuals defined as Ameri-
can Indian, but American Indians have always had
tremendous variation among themselves, and the variations
in many ways have been increased, not reduced, by the events
of history [and] demographic [s].... Allowing self-
identification and the differences it encompasses is simply to
300. AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, at 111.
301. Id.
302. Id. at 112.
303. Charles Wilkinson, Moses Lasky Professor of Law, University of Colorado, Remarks
at American Indian Law Day 2000 at Univ. of Mich. Law School (Mar. 24, 2000).
304. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
305. Supra notes 246-49 and accompanying text.
306. See SHEFFIELD, supra note 25, at 87 (quoting RUSSELL THORNTON, AMERICAN
HOLOCAUST AND SURVIVAL: A POPULATION HISTORY SINCE 1492, at 224 (1987)).
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allow American Indians to be American Indians, something
done all to infrequently in the short history of the United
States."°7
The appeal of self-identification is that it both offers uniformity
and embraces the different notions of "Indianness" which are at
the heart of the confusion. Yet, it is obviously unworkable on many
levels. First and foremost, it is a purely racial category and elimi-
nates any political grounding for the government's special
treatment of Indians. Also, it would be politically unpopular, re-
sulting in unlimited federal responsibility for "Indians" and
drastically eroded tribal sovereignty. Furthermore, it is inevitable
that the Indian population would explode based on the thirty-
eight percent increase in the Census count of the Indian/Alaska
Native population between 1980 and 1990, which far outpaced
what can be explained by birth rates. 38 This increase has led Indi-
ans to joke that the largest tribe in the United States will soon be
the "Wanabi."309 Clearly, then, a law providing higher education
grants to individuals who self-identify as Indian, for example,
would not win many supporters in Congress.
C. A Definition that Defers to Tribes, Includes
'All Other Persons,'and Watches the Government's Bottom Line
As long as race is the basis of the government's definition of In-
dian, self-determination will not be. As discussed supra Part II, the
history and language of the IRA show that it is fundamentally a
race-based policy. According to Fergus Bordewich, "Collier be-
lieved that Native American culture-'this Red Atlantis'-was
morally and aesthetically superior to modern industrialized society
and to its ethos of individualism and competition. 310 Collier saw
the IRA as a means of "awakening the racial spirit."
31
Consequently, the first step Congress should take is to repeal
section 19 of the IRA. Politically and pragmatically, the provision
has outlived its time. The provision providing benefits to "all
persons who are descendants of such members who were, on June
1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of any Indian
307. Id.
308. Gov't Mgmt. Hearings, supra note 7.
309. Russell, supra note 23, at 131.
310. BORDEWlCH, supra note 1, at 71.
311. Id. at 72.
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reservation is a finite class because it applies to descendants who
were living on the reservation in 1934.13 Thus, in the near future,
the provision will be obsolete because the class will have no living
members. The "all other persons of one-half or more of Indian
blood" is clearly unconstitutional under the Mancari rationale,314
and thus should be repealed. The remaining provision, which
refers to members of tribes under federal jurisdiction,315 is by itself
too restrictive and leaves out unenrolled Indians and terminated
and state-recognized tribes.
In creating a definition that would become the prototype for fu-
ture statutory and regulatory provisions, Congress should follow its
own example and retrace the steps it took when it created the
definition of Indian under the Arts and Crafts Act: it should in-
volve Indians in all stages of development of the Act; it should look
for a definition that defers to the sovereignty of federally recog-
nized tribes and yet includes unenrolled Indians and terminated
and state-recognized tribes where possible; it should make the
tribes the arbiters of membership and certification; and it should
consult with the DOJ to ensure that the Act conforms to Supreme
Court precedent.
It is true that there is a crucial difference between the Arts and
Crafts Act and the numerous other laws which populate title 25:
the Act does not entitle Indians to any federally funded benefits.3 1 6 If
the past is prologue, any Indian preference or benefits law that lets
the tribes decide whom to certify and includes terminated and
state-recognized tribes would surely encounter resistance from
both the government and federally recognized tribes. Surely, the
BIA would try to insert a blood quantum requirement.
Thus, a definition that attempts to reconcile these competing in-
terests and could be inserted uniformly in federal Indian benefit
laws follows.
312. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
313. See AIPRC TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 68, for a discussion of the AIPRC in-
terpretation of this provision.
314. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974).
315. 25 U.S.C. § 479 (1994).
316. 25 U.S.C. § 305 (1994).
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D. An "Indian" Is
An Indian is:
a) any individual who is a member of any Indian tribe,
band, nation, Alaska Native village, or other organ-
ized group or community which is recognized as
eligible for the special programs and services pro-
vided by the United States because of their status as
Indians; or for the purpose of this section is certi-
fied as an Indian by a federally recognized Indian
tribe. The Secretary of the Interior shall not impose
a blood quantum requirement on any certification
procedure, but shall defer all authority to the tribes
to decide the basis for certification.
b) any individual who is a member of any non-
federally recognized Indian tribe, including those
tribes, bands, or groups terminated since 1940, and
any Indian group that has been formally recognized
as an Indian tribe by a State legislature or by a State
commission or similar organization legislatively
vested with State tribal recognition authority and
who is a one-quarter blood quantum as certified by
his or her Indian tribe.
Such a definition operates on many levels. This definition satis-
fies the Mancari test317 because it puts the tribes in charge of
certification and links the blood quantum requirement with tribal
membership. The tribes retain their sovereignty through being in
charge of certification of both the unenrolled members included
in subsection (a) and the blood quantum required in subsection
(b). The government is thereby out of the race business as far as
certification is concerned, yet the blood quantum still can be used
to reasonably limit a portion of the eligible population. Finally, the
provision is true to the inclusive spirit of the IRA. It would cover
the Lumbee, the mixed-blood youths in Denver, and the unen-
rolled Seneca artist. It would satisfy the DOJ, and, most important,
it may find supporters in Congress.
It is true that a definition which gives the tribes total control
over certification would involve a true leap of faith on the part of
the federal government, but it is one that the Arts and Crafts Act
317. See Mancari, 417 U.S. at 555.
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suggests that the government is ready to make. According to Steve
Russell, President of the Texas Indian Bar Association:
Whether tribes follow economic incentives in the matter of
blood quantum is, in the final analysis, up to tribal govern-
ments .... At the root, it is tribal sovereignty that defines an
Indian as certainly as it is tribal sovereignty that legitimizes
the treaties that ceded the land upon which the United States
318
rests.
When Glenda Ahhaitty, a member of the U.S. Census Bureau
Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native
Populations, was testifying before Congress in 1999 regarding
census implementation in Indian Country, she said that a basic
determination must be made at the outset when drawing up a
definition of American Indian: Does the definition support
sovereignty and self-determination for Indian people?1 9
Congress and the BIA may someday attempt to clear up the con-
fusion in the law by adopting a uniform provision such as the one
suggested above. Or, they may simply continue to define "Indian"
on an ad hoc basis, responding to the political and legal attitudes
of the time. But what is certain is that the benchmark of the suc-
cess of any definition they adopt will be whether Congress, the
BIA, and Indians can answer Ahhaitty's question with a resounding
'Yes."
318. Russell, supra note 23, at 132.
319. Census Implementation in Indian Country: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Indian
Affairs, 145 CONG. 476 (1999) (statement of Glenda Ahhaitty, member of the U.S. Census
Bureau Advisory Committee on American Indian and Alaska Native Populations), available
at 1999 WL 16947158.
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